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24 November 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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## DAILY BRIEF

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\*Dominican Republic: President Balaguer's moderate regime is already beginning to run into trouble as the current wave of national jubilation subsides. The public continues to press for vengeance against those who carried out Trujillo brutalities. The first open display of hostility against Balaguer since the crisis of last week occurred on 22 November during a demonstration before the presidential palace. The anti-Balaguer sentiment is being stimulated mainly by the 14 of June party (PCJ), which, though much smaller than the moderate National Civic Union, is strong among students and in the capital city. There are indications of a split in the PCJ between more moderate leaders and an extremist faction which is reportedly considering violent action in an attempt to bring down the regime.

Balaguer strengthened his regime significantly with the appointment on 22 November of the Rodriguez Echevarria

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brothers to key military posts. General Rafael Rodriguez Echevarria, who enhanced his reputation as a decisive leader and gained the support of the moderate opposition when he led the brief military action of 19 November against the Trujillos, assumes the highest post in the regime for a military officer. As secretary of state for the armed forces, the 37-year-old air force general becomes first in the constitutional line of succession to the presidency. His brother, Colonel Pedro Santiago Rodriguez Echevarria, becomes chief of the air force, the country's dominant military arm. The respected General Felix Hermida, Jr., newly named secretary of the interior, will be charged with controlling the police, whose transfer from military supervision is an element in Balaguer's democratization program. By replacing his minister of labor, Balaguer has removed the last remaining pro-Trujillo figure from his cabinet.

Balaguer told the American consul general on Wednesday that pro-Castro leader Lopez Molina had been deported the day before. Balaguer had expressed concern over the number of protests received against Molina's detention, and felt this might indicate that pro-Communist groups had developed a more effective organization in the country than he had realized. He also expressed alarm over the effect of radio-broadcasts from Cuba calling for a general strike to force Balaguer's ouster.

Extremist criticism within the Dominican Republic of US "intervention" in the recent crisis has failed to arouse significant popular support. Elsewhere, Brazil has been the only country in the Western Hemisphere, other than Cuba, to criticize US actions during the crisis even indirectly. On 22 November, the Brazilian delegate in the OAS expressed his government's "apprehension" over recent events in the Dominican Republic and urged all OAS members to refrain from any act that could threaten the principle of nonintervention. The UN Security Council took no action on Cuba's

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22 November demand that it condemn US "aggression" in the Dominican Republic, though council president Zorin may submit a resolution on this at the council session today. [REDACTED]

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\*Congo: The 22 November secret debate of the Congolese parliament is an indication of Premier Adoula's continuing hold on the central government. The parliament almost unanimously supported Adoula's condemnation of the Congolese Army's recent activities in Kindu and criticized Gizenga's continued absence from Leopoldville. The standing of Gizenga has declined still further. Stanleyville commander Lundula seems to be genuinely behind Adoula, and Interior Minister Gbenye, a former Gizenga lieutenant, recently intimated [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] that he was no longer associated with his former chief. [REDACTED]

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\*South Korea: The initial favorable South Korean reaction to General Pak Chong-hui's Washington visit has been clouded by an undertone of concern that he failed to obtain necessary assistance from the United States for the solution or amelioration of several basic problems. The factional conflict in the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction may be renewed when PAK returns to Seoul on 25 November.

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Czechoslovakia: Party boss Novotny's report to his party central committee, published on 21 November, appears designed to combat factional strife in the Czech party. Khrushchev's renewed attacks on Stalin apparently have led to a resurgence of demands in Czechoslovakia for a new assessment of those involved in the trial of former party secretary Rudolf Slansky, whose execution for excessive nationalism in 1952 is believed by most Czechoslovak party members to have been carried out on Stalin's orders.

Most of the present top Czechoslovak leaders share some responsibility for Slansky's execution. In his speech Novotny justified the execution by reiterating charges against Slansky for having ruled by police terror. In an attempt to absolve himself of any complicity in Slansky's actions, Novotny for the first time publicly shifted the blame to Gottwald, heretofore highly honored former party chairman and President, who died in 1953. By accusing Gottwald of the personality cult, Novotny has exposed himself to the same charge, since he is the only other

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Czech Communist leader to hold simultaneously the offices  
of head of state and head of party. [REDACTED]

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### WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United  
States Intelligence Board concludes that:

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct mil-  
itary action in the immediate future.]

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Berlin: [The Communists continue their pressure on the  
West's position in Berlin. Further harassments against Allied  
access rights may be anticipated.] [REDACTED]

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### SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for Ghana: present political situation, loyalty  
of army and police, economic problems and prospects, and  
Nkrumah's policies and probable foreign orientation. U.S.I.B.  
SNIE 64.1-61. 4pp. Nov 16'61. [REDACTED]

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### Reaction to South Korean Leader's Washington Visit

Some press comment in South Korea has made reference to Pak's failure to secure an American commitment to specific aid figures and to underwrite the costs of the regime's five-year economic development program. Many lead press stories also noted the omission from joint high-level statements of any reference to Seoul's long-standing desire for a status-of-forces agreement. One prominent newspaper commented that although Pak's pledge to return the government to civilian hands was "no news to us," his reiteration of that pledge in Washington "adds greatly to its weight and verity."

Pak's stopover in Tokyo on 11-12 November to discuss the normalization of Japanese - South Korean relations with Prime Minister Ikeda received heavy but cautiously critical coverage in the South Korean press. South Korean reservations were heightened when the Japanese press claimed that Pak had agreed to drop all financial claims against Japan except those that had a legal basis in Japanese law or Diet actions and had agreed to accept long-term interest-bearing loans in lieu of grants. While the Pak-Ikeda talks appear to have achieved the important objective of developing a sense of confidence between the two leaders, South Korean public doubts and aroused Japanese leftist opposition to a settlement could be a serious obstacle to an early settlement of differences.



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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

## The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

## The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

## The Department of Defense

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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## The United States Information Agency

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## The National Indications Center

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